PonsV2LauncherToken $RAID

Risks (7)

• HighDeployer-funded contract holds 11.3% of supply, controls unknowninsidersAI

  Contract 0x05a3…ecdf was funded by the deployer 0x3883…8b01 and holds 11.338% of supply. That is the largest non-infrastructure holder. It has also made all 47,983 tracked burns, about 9.92% of supply, which points to a game or burn mechanism. Its source and admin are not in the material. If the deployer can withdraw from it, 11% could be sold into roughly $30k of DEX liquidity and crash the price.

  Evidence

  • on-chaininsiders: 0x05a3a6c50edb78ba65cb70ccc4b40f7426f0ecdf fundedBy 0x3883fb5a4abfdf91e63936a5c5393deaac998b01
    Show source

    pctSupplyHeldNow: 11.338

  • on-chainburns.by: 0x05a3a6c50edb78ba65cb70ccc4b40f7426f0ecdf kind contract pct 9.9234 count 47983

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumBuying currently failshoneypotDeterministic

  A simulated buy reverted. Trading may not be enabled yet, or the contract restricts who can buy. Re-check before interacting.

  Evidence

  • forkfork simulation on uniswap-v4 pool 0x14e15048c58170d38e0c2a405ebb7a6a7d82bcd2d1eba29231f4aa5c21fdb4ec: buy reverted
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    buy reverted: Execution reverted for an unknown reason. | venue uniswap-v4 fee tier 50000 — pool LP fee is included in quotes; reported taxes are token-level

  • forkbuy reverted: Execution reverted for an unknown reason.
    Show source

    canBuy: false

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x14e15048c5…: v4 position liquidity: none tracked
  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L845-L855
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    function _takeExact(Currency currency, address token, uint256 amount) private {
            if (currency.isAddressZero()) {
                poolManager.take(currency, address(this), amount);
                return;
            }
    
            uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
            poolManager.take(currency, address(this), amount);
            uint256 received = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - balanceBefore;
            if (received != amount) revert InexactQuoteTransfer(token, amount, received);
        }

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5

• MediumGame payments go to a private wallet with no on-chain refundwebsiteAI

  In the dApp test, the 'get the money back out' flow made the test wallet pay 0.00044 ETH directly to the externally owned address 0x1438…523e. This was presented as a non-refundable game entry fee. The site then waited on off-chain backend verification, and no withdrawal was possible. Money paid into the RaidLords game goes to a private wallet, not to a verifiable contract. Any payout or refund depends entirely on the operator's off-chain backend. Note that the tooling flagged this address as having no code and as created during the test, so its identity on mainnet is unverified.

  Evidence

  • forkdappTests: get the money back out (withdraw, sell or exit) — tx 1
    Show source

    WARNING: sends 0.00044 ETH directly to an EOA 0x143834046cae4c3f75c2eef63b913eb1fc8a523e — third party

  • tx0xfd76df1e…89d40406
  • forkdappTests: get the money back out — observed
    Show source

    Cannot withdraw entry fee: the ETH was paid directly to a third-party EOA as a non-refundable game entry fee, and the site UI is blocked waiting for off-chain backend verification.

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumOne Pons owner controls the hook, factory, vault and lockerownershipAI

  Address 0x263e…19Dd owns the hook, factory, buyback vault and LP locker. The hook cannot be renounced. On the hook, this owner can: - change future fee policy; - rotate the fee-sweep operator, who sets minimum outputs when fee tokens are converted; - force-pay pending fees to the snapshotted recipients via rescuePoolFees. On the factory, the owner can redirect creator fee recipients, rescue curve fees and graduation leftovers, and change launch settings. Holders' tokens and swaps on this already-graduated pool cannot be blocked by these functions. The main exposure is to fee flows. The factory source was omitted, so its exact limits are unverified.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L235-L237
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    function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
            revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L274-L278
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    function setFeeSweepOperator(address operator) external onlyOwner {
            if (operator == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            feeSweepOperator = operator;
            emit FeeSweepOperatorUpdated(operator);
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L555-L603
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    function rescuePoolFees(PoolId poolId)
            external
            onlyOwner
            nonReentrant
            returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount)
        {
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            address quoteToken = info.quoteToken;
    
            if (quoteToken != address(0)) {
                (protocolAmount, creatorAmount) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, quoteToken);
            }
            (uint256 memecoinProtocol, uint256 memecoinCreator) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, info.memecoin);
            if (protocolAmount == 0 && creatorAmount == 0 && memecoinProtocol == 0 && memecoinCreator == 0) {

  • on-chainPonsV2LaunchFactory owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; rescueSweptGraduation(address,address) [owner]; rescueCurveFees(address) [owner]

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumSnipers and bundles took about 8% at launch, mostly soldsnipersAI

  Twenty sniper wallets bought 8.26% of supply in the first 100 blocks and still hold about 2.15%. Several same-block bundles appear. One, funded by 0x035f…11f7, took 2.62%, and its cluster holds 0 now. Some bundles list the hook address itself, which is a fee-collection artifact, not a buyer. The remaining dump pressure from these groups is modest.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: pctSupplyBought 8.2595, pctSupplyHeldNow 2.1505
  • on-chainbundles block 98529263 commonFunder 0x035f19df18cc4ec0a0b3a528eb7ac16c8df011f7 pctSupply 2.6198; clusters funder 0x035f… pctSupplyHeldNow 0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowOwners of the largest pool's liquidity are unknownliquidityAI

  The launchpad reports pool 0x14e15048… as the graduated pool, and it carries the largest liquidity figure (about $17.3k). The scan tracked no liquidity holders for it, and the position scan was partial. It cannot be confirmed who controls that liquidity or whether it is locked. Two tiny side pools ($4 and $1) are held by unlocked wallets, which is negligible.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x14e15048c5…: v4 LP: position scan partial (355 positions, 150 read) — shares cover the positions found
  • on-chainliquidity pool 0x14e15048c58170d38e0c2a405ebb7a6a7d82bcd2d1eba29231f4aa5c21fdb4ec liquidityUsd 17283

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowEvery swap pays a fixed 3% hook fee and creator taxfeesAI

  Every swap in the Pons-hook pool pays the hook fee (1%) plus the creator tax (2%), taken from the swap's unspecified side. The rates are snapshotted into the pool's record at registration, and the hook reads that record, not the live owner setting. The owner can later raise the global hook fee up to 10%, but that only affects new launches. The combined fee is capped at 20% at registration. Split: 30% of the 1% fee goes to the protocol. The rest, plus the full 2% tax, goes to the creator, minus a buyback slice if buyback is enabled.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L444-L485
    Show source

    function _afterSwap(address, PoolKey calldata key, SwapParams calldata params, BalanceDelta delta, bytes calldata)
            internal
            override
            returns (bytes4, int128)
        {
            // The conversion and buyback legs swap against this same pool, but
            // they are never taxed here: v4-core skips a pool's hooks when the
            // hook itself is the caller (Hooks.afterSwap). Were that not so, the
            // skim would come out of the buyback before it reached the vault.
            PoolId poolId = key.toId();
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
            if (info.hookFeeBps == 0 && info.creatorTaxBps == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            bool specifiedIsCurrency0 = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == params.zeroForOne;

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L342-L352
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    if (
                policy.protocolFeeRecipient == address(0) || policy.protocolFeeShareBps > MAX_PROTOCOL_FEE_SHARE_BPS
                    || policy.buybackBurnBps > BASIS_POINTS || policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS
                    || policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps == 0 || policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps >= BASIS_POINTS
            ) {
                revert InvalidBps();
            }
            // The curve bounds the same sum in its own constructor rather than
            // inheriting it from the factory. A pool taking more than the whole
            // unspecified leg would flip the swapper's output delta negative.
            if (uint256(creatorTaxBps) + policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L251-L255
    Show source

    function setHookFeeBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
            hookFeeBps = bps;
            emit HookFeeBpsUpdated(bps);
        }

  • on-chainlaunchpad: curve feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=200

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

Positive signals (3)

• PositiveOngoing token burns verified on-chain: 24.1% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  24.1% of the supply ever minted is burned (at least: the transfer history was read partially), in 47983 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-05. Burned by: contract 0x05a3…ecdf (9.9%, 47983 burns). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0xd56a6c45941ee8aae31ce6a30bd049e0f7489cbd
  • on-chainBurn addresses hold 24.1191% of supply
  • on-chainDeployer 0x3883fb5a4abfdf91e63936a5c5393deaac998b01 holds 0% now

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveToken is a fixed-supply Pons template with no owner powersotherAI

  RAID is the standard Pons V2 launch token: OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus voluntary burn. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. There is no owner, no mint after deploy, no fee, no blacklist, no pause and no transfer hook. The token code cannot stop anyone from buying, selling or transferring. The stored deployer address is reference data only and gives no privileges. Slither reported no issues.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
    Show source

    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L44-L71
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    constructor(
            string memory name_,
            string memory symbol_,
            string memory logo_,
            string memory description_,
            Socials memory socials_,
            address deployer_,
            address curve_,
            address launchFactory_,
            uint256 supply_
        ) ERC20(name_, symbol_) {
            if (deployer_ == address(0) || curve_ == address(0) || launchFactory_ == address(0)) {
                revert ZeroAddress();
            }

  • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
    Show source

    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • on-chaincontract.isProxy = false; privileges = []
  • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveHooked pool liquidity is permanently lockedliquidityAI

  All tracked liquidity of the Pons-hook pool 0xeba5c93b… (about $13.8k) is held by the PonsV2LaunchLocker, labelled as a permanent LP lock. The locker's function table shows only lock functions and no withdraw or release. The deployer holds no LP.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0xeba5c93b5a…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x267444d099b10fb5ed7c3cc7b7c767adca574952 [locked: PonsV2LaunchLocker (permanent LP lock)] 100%
  • on-chainliquidity pool 0xeba5c93b5adb45487d6daf9661632ba7e663011654dd9ccf561a1efbe490d656: lpLockedPct 100, lpHeldByDeployerPct 0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (1)

• InfoWebsite domain registered 9 days before launchwebsiteAI

  raidlords.com was registered on 2026-10-17. The token launched on 2026-10-26. This is a young project with no long track record.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-10-17T12:59:33.000Z; contract.deployedAt = 2026-10-26T15:47:44.000Z

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol