PonsV2LauncherToken $KILLFLOOR

Risks (10)

• CriticalWithdrawing through the dApp failed ("Redeem agent shares")honeypotDeterministic

  We ran the project's own dApp on a local fork. The "Redeem agent shares" step did not work. Expected: Redeem in kind (always available) or for dollars only (up to 1% slippage). Redemption in kind needs no price and no backend, so backers can always exit. Redeem your shares after a short cooldown, in kind or for dollars only. (source: https://killfloor.org/faq, https://killfloor.org/docs, https://killfloor.org/). Observed: wallet no balance change; 0 tx (none). No successful transaction was made for this goal (timeout). | driver: timeout — goal time cap reached. Money deposited may be impossible to take out.

  Evidence

  • forkdApp test "Redeem agent shares" on a local fork (https://app.killfloor.org/floor)
    Show source

    wallet no balance change; 0 tx (none). No successful transaction was made for this goal (timeout). | driver: timeout — goal time cap reached

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighClaim contradicted: The 5% fee from Fade bets is earmarked for future KILLFLOOR token buybacks.claims-mismatchDeterministic

  The project claims token burns / buybacks, but no tokens of this contract were ever sent to a burn address or destroyed.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/klll_floor/status/2116218626818658577
    Show source

    earmarked for future $KILLFLOOR token buybacks.

  • on-chainTransfer events of 0xaf2d6cc1586539997840d4635480c2f8494dac2e to burn addresses + balanceOf(0x…dEaD)

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighDump risk: launch wallets still hold 31.3% of supplyholdersDeterministic

  Sniper / insider / bundled launch wallets still hold about 31.3% of the supply. If they sell, the price can collapse — current dump pressure is HIGH.

  Evidence

  • on-chainheld now: snipers 30.3189%, insiders 31.32%, clusters 19.7%

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighCreator-declared wallets bought 55.6% of supply at launchinsidersDeterministic

  32 wallet(s) linked to the team (declared by the creator at launch, exempt from the snipe tax) bought 55.6% of the supply in the first blocks — an insider allocation that real buyers did not get. They now hold 31.3%, so current dump pressure from them is HIGH.

  Evidence

  • on-chaininsiders: 32 wallets, fundedBy declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve; creator 0x29d86c12dc00d6257bde7ecc4160e9b79468efdd), bought at launch 55.59%, pctSupplyHeldNow 31.3189
  • on-chaintoken.insiders[0].fundedBy / pctSupplyHeldNow
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    declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve; creator 0x29d86c12dc00d6257bde7ecc4160e9b79468efdd) — pctSupplyHeldNow 31.3189

  • on-chaintoken.liquidity[0].liquidityUsd
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    19857

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• HighLaunch sniped: 33 wallets took 64.3% of supply in 11 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 33 wallets bought 64.3% of the supply within 11 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 30.3% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is HIGH — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=33, pctSupplyBought=64.3086, pctSupplyHeldNow=30.3189
  • on-chaintoken.bundles[0] (block 100350783)
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    commonFunder 0xa5a5491bca93dd4c076e4906e79e7673f4a5a142, pctSupply 38.3118

  • on-chaintoken.bundles[1] (block 100350784)
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    commonFunder 0x728f51950ff096dc03a48f5e83f45ac8bb75f500, pctSupply 17.2756

  • on-chaintoken.snipers
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    pctSupplyBought 64.3086, pctSupplyHeldNow 30.3189

  • on-chaintoken.clusters[0]
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    funder 0x728f51950ff096dc03a48f5e83f45ac8bb75f500 ... pctSupplyHeldNow 8.4751

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• HighAgent deposits sit in an unverified vault with kill/trade functionsotherAI

  In the dApp test, backing an agent approved exactly 10 USDG and called requestDeposit on the agent contract 0xEd4b…f938 ('KF-3 token'). That contract now holds the 10 USDG. Its source is unverified. Its function list includes kill(), retire(), trade(address,address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes), crystallize() and claimOwed(address). Nobody can check who may call these or where trade() can send the deposited funds. The site promises 'backers can always exit' by redeeming in kind, but the redeem test produced no transaction (UI timeout). That exit path is therefore unproven, not proven broken. Backers must fully trust unverified code and its operators with their deposits.

  Evidence

  • forkdappTests 'Back agent' tx requestDeposit
    Show source

    wallet -10 USDG → 0xed4b…f938 (KF-3 token) [unverified contract — third party?]

  • tx0x3a45594c…8c9110f3
  • forkdappTests 'Redeem agent shares'
    Show source

    could not complete "Redeem agent shares" in the UI (timeout: goal time cap reached)

  • staticrelated KF-3 token 0xEd4bEa49e2650Ae96b9d13a7cF5D70624089f938 function table
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    fn kill() [unknown (unverified)] risk=critical

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• HighApp owner can pause agents and change redeem cooldown and limitspauseAI

  The app contract 0x37A0…a3d5 is unverified and owned by 0x7370…CD1E. It looks like the agent registry/factory: it has vaultOf, vaultImplementation and agentCount. It exposes setPaused(bool), setRedeemCooldown(uint64), setLimits(...), setAdapter(address,bool), setRoles(address,address,address) and setAssetClass. The owner could pause the system, lengthen the redeem cooldown, or approve new trading adapters that agents can route funds through. Any of these could delay or block backers' exits. No bounds or timelock can be verified, because the source is not published. This does not affect the KILLFLOOR token itself.

  Evidence

  • staticrelated 0x37A0b894b7636D6B87B6aA4055427665cBBba3d5 function table
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    fn setPaused(bool) [unknown (unverified)] risk=high; fn setRedeemCooldown(uint64) ... risk=medium; fn setLimits(...) risk=medium

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumApp price oracle is fed by an owner-appointed posterotherAI

  The unverified contract 0x2615…8eEc is owned by 0x7370…CD1E. It has post(address[],uint256[]) and priceE18(address), and the owner can call setPoster, setMaxMoveBps and setMaxAge. The site's agent valuations (NAV, share prices, bet settlement) likely depend on these posted prices; that link is inferred, not verified. If so, the owner could appoint a poster and loosen the max-move limit. Posted prices could then misvalue agent shares at deposit or redemption.

  Evidence

  • staticrelated 0x26157d6B41587d6Ef36db16251383B0F14108eEc function table
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    fn setMaxMoveBps(uint16) [unknown (unverified)] risk=high; fn setPoster(address); fn post(address[],uint256[])

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• LowIBM partnership is claimed only by the project itselfclaims-mismatchAI

  On 29 Oct 2026 the project said it had only applied to IBM Partner Plus. Six days later it announced official acceptance and access to IBM technology. A search of posts about that claim returns only Killfloor’s own announcements. IBM, IBMPartners, and IBMDeveloper are tagged but did not confirm it in the results. Treat the partnership as unverified marketing, not as proof of enterprise backing.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/klll_floor/status/2115948028729205224
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    We've submitted our application to join the @IBM Partner Plus program.

  • Xhttps://x.com/klll_floor/status/2117956690666532965
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    We're proud to announce our official acceptance into the @IBM Partner Plus program, joining the @IBMPartners ecosystem.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• LowFade fee described differently on X and on the websiteclaims-mismatchAI

  The X account says every Fade bet carries a 5% fee that goes to a city treasury for future token buybacks. The website says the fade fee is taken from winnings, never from stakes, and lists a separate 5% protocol fee on profits above a high-water mark. Holders cannot tell from these two sources whether a bet is charged 5% up front or only winners pay.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/klll_floor/status/2116218626818658577
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    Every Fade bet carries a 5% fee, directed to the City Treasury and earmarked for future $KILLFLOOR token buybacks.

  • webhttps://killfloor.org/
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    Fade fee Taken from winnings in fade rounds, never from stakes.

  • webhttps://killfloor.org/
    Show source

    5% Protocol fee Of profits above the high-water mark, to Killfloor.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (3)

• PositiveToken is a fixed-supply Pons template with no owner powersownershipAI

  KILLFLOOR is the standard PonsV2LauncherToken: a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus a voluntary burn function. It has no owner, mint, fee, blacklist, pause or proxy. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. 'deployer' is stored only for information and gives no privileges. The custom code only adds read-only metadata functions. Slither found no issues.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21-L71
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    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {
        struct Socials {
            string twitter;
            string telegram;
            string discord;
            string website;
            string farcaster;
        }
    
        error ZeroAddress();
    
        address public immutable deployer;
        address public immutable launchFactory;
        address public immutable curve;

  • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
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    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • staticstatic.issues = [] (slither 0.11.6)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveFork test: buys and sells work at 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  A real buy and sell on a fork of the graduated Uniswap v4 pool both succeeded, with output exactly as expected. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and selling after one hour worked too. Token-level buy, sell and transfer tax are all 0%.

  Evidence

  • forksimulation.notes
    Show source

    second wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is permanently locked by the Pons lockerliquidityAI

  All liquidity of the graduated pool 0x89a3a698… is held by the PonsV2LaunchLocker, a permanent LP lock. The deployer holds none of it, so the main liquidity cannot be pulled. Three other small KILLFLOOR v4 pools exist with unlocked liquidity, but they hold only $20, $2 and $0.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken.notes: v4 position liquidity holders of 0x89a3a69840…
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    0x267444d099b10fb5ed7c3cc7b7c767adca574952 [locked: PonsV2LaunchLocker (permanent LP lock)] 100%

  • on-chaintoken.liquidity[0]
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    lpLockedPct 100, lpHeldByDeployerPct 0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (4)

• MediumMain pool hook can alter swaps; its code was not reviewedotherAI

  The main KILLFLOOR pool is attached to the hook 0xE5e7…e044 (PonsV2MemeHook). The hook has the permissions beforeInitialize, afterSwap and afterSwapReturnsDelta, so after every swap it can take a cut of, or change, the swap output. The fork simulation measured 0% token-level buy and sell tax and no reverts, so today it does not block or heavily tax trades. The hook source and its admin settings were not provided, so I cannot verify who could change its behavior or where any fee goes. The launchpad notes say 'hook fees may apply' after graduation.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken.notes: uniswap-v4 0x89a3a69840… hook permissions
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    v4 hook 0xE5e702641Ea86F4ae6cC3cDaeD2B886f976Be044 permissions: beforeInitialize, afterSwap, afterSwapReturnsDelta

  • forksimulation buyTaxPct/sellTaxPct
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    canBuy true, buyTaxPct 0, canSell true, sellTaxPct 0

  • on-chainlaunchpad.fees.notes
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    after graduation trades go through the Uniswap v4 pool (hook fees may apply)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoDeployer holds 1% and has not solddeployer-historyAI

  The deployer wallet 0x29D8…Efdd holds 1% and has sold 0%. No earlier deployer history was recorded. Note, however, that the deployer is part of the creator-declared insider group.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken.notes / deployerSoldPct
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    Deployer 0x29d86c12dc00d6257bde7ecc4160e9b79468efdd holds 1% now; deployerSoldPct 0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoAnonymous team; X account about two weeks oldsocialAI

  The public face is @klll_floor, created 21 Oct 2026, verified, with 198 followers. The site and posts name no person. The domain was created 7 Oct 2026 and the token was deployed 28 Oct 2026. That fits a new anonymous project, not a bought old account, and it is not by itself proof of a rug. Nobody is publicly accountable if the product or token claims fail.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/klll_floor/status/2115543076651286736
    Show source

    The $KILLFLOOR token is live. CA: 0xaf2d6cc1586539997840d4635480c2f8494dac2e

  • webhttps://killfloor.org/terms
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    Terms of use Last updated Oct 17, 2026 · draft pending legal review

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• InfoProject says its app contracts are unaudited and its terms are a draftwebsiteAI

  Killfloor’s own docs say the protocol contracts have not had an external audit, and the terms page is labeled a draft pending legal review. The site also says a compromised backend cannot withdraw backer funds and that sells and redemptions stay open if the app is paused. Those are disclosures about the agent product, not a third-party check, and they do not describe owner powers on the KILLFLOOR token itself.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://killfloor.org/docs
    Show source

    The contracts have not had an external audit yet. When one is done, the full report and every fix will be linked here.

  • webhttps://killfloor.org/docs
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    The backend holds separate keys to trade, post prices and bill fuel. None of them can withdraw backer funds.

  • webhttps://killfloor.org/terms
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    Terms of use for the Killfloor website and app (draft pending legal review).

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol