FlapTaxTokenV3 $LIQT

Risks (9)

• CriticalDump risk: launch wallets still hold 53.8% of supplyholdersDeterministic

  Sniper / insider / bundled launch wallets still hold about 53.8% of the supply. If they sell, the price can collapse — current dump pressure is HIGH.

  Evidence

  • on-chainheld now: snipers 53.7665%, insiders 0%, clusters 9.33%

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighLaunch sniped: 105 wallets took 68.1% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 105 wallets bought 68.1% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 53.8% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is HIGH.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=105, pctSupplyBought=68.0815, pctSupplyHeldNow=53.7665

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighOne funder's 92 wallets bundled 65.7% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  92 wallets funded by the same address 0xcdd3…2af2 bought 65.7% of the supply together (block 105234402). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0xcdd37ada79f589c15bd4f8fd2083dc88e34a2af2: 92 wallets, pctSupply 65.74
  • on-chaintoken.bundles[0]: block 105234402, 91 wallets, commonFunder 0xcdd37ada79f589c15bd4f8fd2083dc88e34a2af2, pctSupply 65.7392
    Show source

    "commonFunder": "0xcdd37ada79f589c15bd4f8fd2083dc88e34a2af2", "pctSupply": 65.7392

  • on-chaintoken.snipers: pctSupplyBought 68.0815, pctSupplyHeldNow 53.7665
    Show source

    "pctSupplyBought": 68.0815, "pctSupplyHeldNow": 53.7665

  • on-chaintoken.liquidity uniswap-v2 0xe1Dbfc2F0fEdC80D2517258FFa74ee7FEB5Ad694 liquidityUsd 31372; pool holds 15.8256% of supply
  • on-chaintoken.clusters (funders 0xcdd37ada79f589c15bd4f8fd2083dc88e34a2af2, 0x88d25c861938a91af4ad57ad964a8fcc6c6351d3, 0xa67d7eb4dc68fa6ce8e34ef8cadaf075b9893fbb, 0xa5df4d576a72ddbbb4296614aaf58ed6696ebe61)
  • on-chaintoken.freshWalletsPct = 24.5376

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• High'100% fair launch' claim contradicted by one-funder launch bundleclaims-mismatchAI

  Calling this a “100% fair launch” is misleading: a same-block launch bundle acquired 65.7392% of supply, with the wallets linked to one common funder. Launch-window wallets collectively bought 68.0815% and still held 53.7665% when measured, creating substantial coordinated concentration and dump risk.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/Liquidit_X/status/2117500016453689439
    Show source

    $LIQT launches today on @RobinhoodCrypto A 100% fair launch on https://t.co/NH8QPwO0e5.

  • on-chainbundles[0]: block = 105234402; commonFunder = 0xcdd37ada79f589c15bd4f8fd2083dc88e34a2af2; pctSupply = 65.7392
  • on-chainsnipers.pctSupplyBought = 68.0815; snipers.pctSupplyHeldNow = 53.7665
  • on-chainLaunch (first liquidity/curve trade) block 105234402; sniper window 100 blocks (10s)

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol · Disputed by: claude-opus-5.5

• MediumContract is upgradeableproxy-upgradeDeterministic

  The contract logic can be replaced by its proxy admin (admin type unknown).

  Evidence

  • on-chainminimal proxy; implementation 0x7777C8743C88B3aff3cf262135beF2c8b2e83333; admin unknown

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumDeployer can set holder revenue share to 0% at any timeclaims-mismatchAI

  The website links to a RevenueSplitter on Arbitrum that is meant to split protocol interest 50/50 between a 'holder revenue' wallet and a 'growth' wallet. Its DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE holder is the deployer EOA 0xd8afD859…. The growth recipient is that same deployer EOA. Through setRecipients the deployer can set the holder share to 0% and/or redirect both recipients at any time, with no timelock. The holder revenue wallet 0xbF863D0C… is itself an unexplained address. The admin can also pull pending fees from the pool to any address via claimFromPool. Any holder revenue promise therefore rests entirely on trust in the deployer.

  Evidence

  • codeRevenueSplitter.sol:L63-L77
    Show source

    function setRecipients(address holderRevenue_, address growth_, uint256 holderShareBps_)
            external
            onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)
        {
            _setRecipients(holderRevenue_, growth_, holderShareBps_);
        }
    
        function _setRecipients(address holderRevenue_, address growth_, uint256 holderShareBps_) internal {
            if (holderRevenue_ == address(0) || growth_ == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            if (holderShareBps_ > BPS) revert InvalidParameter();
            holderRevenue = holderRevenue_;
            growth = growth_;
            holderShareBps = holderShareBps_;
            emit RecipientsUpdated(holderRevenue_, growth_, holderShareBps_);
        }

  • codeRevenueSplitter.sol:L58-L61
    Show source

    /// @notice Collect a fee payment the pool had to set aside because it could not be delivered.
        function claimFromPool(address pool, address to) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) returns (uint256) {
            return IClaimable(pool).claim(to);
        }

  • on-chainRevenueSplitter growth = 0xd8afD859b9945a5D577D88Ac2BB89bc2Db348219; owner=0xd8afD859b9945a5D577D88Ac2BB89bc2Db348219

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumTransfers depend on an unverified dividend contract that could block themhoneypotAI

  After every transfer the token calls IDividend(dividendContract).setShare for the sender and the receiver. If that call fails, the whole transfer reverts. The dividend contract (0xaA2d…525c) was not provided for review. Per the interface it is administered by the Portal, which has setDividendToken and emergencyWithdraw. If that contract were upgraded, paused or misconfigured so that setShare reverts, nobody could transfer or sell the token. Today the simulated buy, sell and wallet-to-wallet transfer all worked.

  Evidence

  • codeFlapTaxTokenV3.sol:L382-L404
    Show source

    function _afterTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
            // Update dividend shares if dividendContract is set
            if (dividendContract != address(0)) {
                bool shouldSkipFrom = _shouldSkipDividendShare(from);
                bool shouldSkipTo = _shouldSkipDividendShare(to);
    
                if (!shouldSkipFrom) {
                    try IDividend(dividendContract).setShare(from, balanceOf(from)) {}
                    catch (bytes memory reason) {
                        revert DividendShareUpdateFailed(from, reason);
                    }
                }
    
                if (!shouldSkipTo) {
                    try IDividend(dividendContract).setShare(to, balanceOf(to)) {}

  • on-chaindividendContract = 0xaA2d185c7d9e6F0e1eE7922A567904E57Dcb525c
  • codeIDividend.sol:L176-L181
    Show source

    /// @notice Update the dividend token address
        /// @dev Only callable by the owner (Portal). Any undistributed dividends accrued
        ///      under the previous token should be distributed (or recovered via emergencyWithdraw)
        ///      before calling this function, as the accounting will switch to the new token immediately.
        /// @param newToken The new token to distribute as dividends (must be non-zero)
        function setDividendToken(address newToken) external;

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• Low2% tax flows to unverified processor whose payout Portal admins can changefeesAI

  Buys and sells to the pool pay 2% each (fixed, no setter). The tax is sent to taxProcessor 0xa358…9145, which is not verified in this material. The token gives that processor an unlimited allowance over the token's own collected tax balance. How the processor splits the tax (marketing, dividends, LP, burn) and who receives it cannot be checked. The Portal exposes changeMarketWallet, setTokenDividendToken and recoverStuckTaxProcessor, which according to its changelog are gated to admin or manage roles. Those roles can therefore redirect where the tax ends up. They cannot raise the 2% rate.

  Evidence

  • codeFlapTaxTokenV3.sol:L352-L375
    Show source

    function _processTax(uint256 taxAmount) internal returns (bool) {
            if (taxAmount == 0) return true;
    
            // Approve TaxProcessor to pull tokens
            if (allowance(address(this), taxProcessor) < taxAmount) {
                _approve(address(this), taxProcessor, type(uint256).max);
            }
    
            // Call TaxProcessor.processTaxTokens; capture the directional indicator
            try ITaxProcessor(taxProcessor).processTaxTokens(taxAmount) returns (int8 direction) {
                // V3 fix: actually call _adjustLiquidationThreshold with the returned direction
                _adjustLiquidationThreshold(direction);
            } catch (bytes memory reason) {
                emit TaxLiquidationError(reason);
                // If processing failed, transfer remaining tokens directly to taxProcessor

  • codePortal.sol:L581-L590
    Show source

    function changeMarketWallet(
            address,
            /*token*/
            address /*newMarketWallet*/
        )
            external
            override
        {
            _delegateToImpl(PORTAL_TWEAK);
        }

  • on-chaintaxProcessor = 0xa3584c5d2e91aFBa0e06611E54f7e153aCd39145

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowLending app is custodial-style: X or email login, no seed phrasesocialAI

  The team says borrowers and lenders sign in with X or email, never get a seed phrase, and that LiquidIt pays Arbitrum gas. Anyone using the app is trusting LiquidIt's login system with the USDC they deposit or borrow, not a wallet they alone control. That is separate from the token contract, whose owner is already renounced.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/Liquidit_X/status/2118436492762878160
    Show source

    You can sign up with X or email, with no seed phrase and no ETH needed for gas.

  • Xhttps://x.com/Liquidit_X/status/2118007981396967471
    Show source

    You sign in with X or email, so there’s no seed phrase. LiquidIt pays the gas on Arbitrum, so you don’t need ETH.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (3)

• PositiveAbout 99.7% of LP tokens burned, liquidity cannot be pulledliquidityAI

  99.68% of the Uniswap V2 LP tokens sit at the 0x…dead burn address. The deployer holds none, so the main liquidity cannot be pulled by the team.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v2 0xe1Dbfc2F0fEdC80D2517258FFa74ee7FEB5Ad694 lpBurnedPct 99.6849, lpHeldByDeployerPct 0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveOwner renounced; no mint, blacklist or tax-change functionsownershipAI

  The token is a standard Flap launchpad FlapTaxTokenV3 clone. The Portal renounced ownership at launch, so owner() is the zero address. The only owner functions were the one-way migration state switches, and those are already done (state 2). Supply was minted once at 1B in initialize, which cannot run again. Buy and sell tax are fixed at 2% with no setter, and there is no blacklist, pause or max-transaction limit. The proxy is a minimal clone of a fixed implementation and cannot be upgraded.

  Evidence

  • on-chainowner() returns 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 (renounced); tx 0x49c41ac71850a8a8cb7d946af221840d87508068873a90c9edc757148452383d
  • codeFlapTaxTokenV3.sol:L164-L184
    Show source

    function startMigration() external override onlyOwner {
            PackedPoolState memory currentPoolState = poolState;
            if (PoolState(currentPoolState.state) == PoolState.BondingCurve) {
                currentPoolState.state = uint8(PoolState.Migrating);
                poolState = currentPoolState;
                emit PoolStateChanged(uint8(PoolState.BondingCurve), currentPoolState.state);
            }
        }
    
        /// @notice Finalizes the migration by transitioning the state of the pool
        function finalizeMigration() external override onlyOwner {
            PackedPoolState memory currentPoolState = poolState;
            if (PoolState(currentPoolState.state) == PoolState.Migrating) {
                currentPoolState.state = uint8(PoolState.TaxEnforcedAntiFarmer);
                currentPoolState.taxExpirationTime = uint64(currentPoolState.taxExpirationTime + block.timestamp);

  • codeFlapTaxTokenV3.sol:L119-L161
    Show source

    function initialize(InitParams memory params) external override initializer {
            v2Router = params.v2Router;
            antiFarmerDuration = params.antiFarmerDuration;
    
            require(params.taxDuration >= antiFarmerDuration, "Tax duration must be >= anti-farmer duration");
    
            __ERC20_init(params.name, params.symbol);
            __ERC20Permit_init(params.name);
            __Ownable_init();
    
            metaURI = params.meta;
            require(params.taxProcessor != address(0), "taxProcessor required");
            taxProcessor = params.taxProcessor;
            dividendContract = params.dividendContract;

  • on-chainowner() = null; ownerRenounced = true
    Show source

    owner: null, ownerRenounced: true, verified: true

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveSimulation: buy and sell work at 2% tax, transfers untaxedhoneypotAI

  A forked buy and sell both succeeded at 2% token tax. A wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell after 1 hour worked. Wallet-to-wallet transfers are untaxed. This matches the tax code paths.

  Evidence

  • forksimulation: canBuy true, buyTaxPct 2, canSell true, sellTaxPct 2, transferTaxPct 0
  • codeFlapTaxTokenV3.sol:L196-L223
    Show source

    function _getTaxWithPoolState(address from, address to, uint256 amount, PackedPoolState memory currentPoolState)
            internal
            view
            returns (uint256)
        {
            if (currentPoolState.notLiquidating) {
                if (PoolState(currentPoolState.state) == PoolState.TaxEnforcedAntiFarmer) {
                    // Apply tax if transfer involves any pool
                    if (pools[from]) {
                        // Buy: tokens flowing FROM pool TO user
                        return (amount * currentPoolState.buyTaxRate) / 10000;
                    } else if (pools[to]) {
                        // Sell: tokens flowing FROM user TO pool
                        return (amount * currentPoolState.sellTaxRate) / 10000;
                    }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (4)

• LowWebsite is days old and app deposit/withdraw could not be testedwebsiteAI

  The domain liquidit.app was created on 2026-10-30, a few days before token launch, and has no Wayback snapshots. Both dApp tests failed because the app requires X or email sign-in instead of an external wallet. No deposit or withdraw path of the lending product could be verified on a fork.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://liquidit.app/
    Show source

    LiquidIt — Borrow USDC against your Hyperliquid perps | Perp-backed loans

  • forkdappTests: sell or exit the position (get the money back)
    Show source

    App does not support connecting an external web3 browser wallet; only X and email login are available.

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoX account only days old and team is anonymoussocialAI

  @Liquidit_X was created on 2026-10-31 and the domain on 2026-10-30, a few days before the 2026-11-03 token deploy. The display name is Liquidlt, not LiquidIt. No founder name appears in the bio or the posts reviewed. A new anonymous account is not proof of a scam, but there is nobody publicly identified to hold accountable.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://liquidit.app/
    Show source

    LiquidIt lets you borrow USDC against your open Hyperliquid perp positions without closing them

  • Xhttps://x.com/Liquidit_X/status/2117500016453689439
    Show source

    $LIQT launches today on @RobinhoodCrypto

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• InfoTreasury and loan list claims not visible on fetched pageswebsiteAI

  Posts say a treasury page lists every wallet and about $104k, and that Scan lists every loan. Opening liquidit.app, /treasury, /scan, and the docs URL all returned only the same one-line product pitch. The balances and loans cannot be checked from those pages, so the TVL and payout claims stay unverified, not disproven.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/Liquidit_X/status/2117932742285611074
    Show source

    Treasury shows every wallet and its live balance across three chains, $104,437 right now. Scan lists every loan with links to verify it on-chain.

  • webhttps://liquidit.app/treasury
    Show source

    LiquidIt lets you borrow USDC against your open Hyperliquid perp positions without closing them — or lend USDC and earn half of every interest payment.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoUnconfirmed post claims earlier LIQT runs dieddeployer-historyAI

  One low-engagement post says prior LIQT runs died, but the sentence is cut off and names no contract or wallet. Contract basics list an empty deployer history. Treat the earlier-rug claim as unverified.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/0xCR33P/status/2117676497431314855
    Show source

    LiquidIt pitches perp lending on HyperLiquid, prior LIQT runs died at.

  • on-chaindeployerHistory=[]
    Show source

    deployer 0xd8afD859b9945a5D577D88Ac2BB89bc2Db348219, deployerHistory empty

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol